both when writing legal history and when they were writing substantively about legal policy.
The focus is mainly but not exclusively American. Rabban begins with brief biographical overviews of several American legal scholars who wrote about legal history. Most of these were not primarily legal historians, but they did take distinctively historical approaches to legal policy. Rabban's principal thesis is that writing about Gilded Age and Progressive Era law has underestimated the role of history in both classical legal thought and the progressive thought that succeeded it. For the former, the law has too often been presented as formalistic, static and rule bound. For the latter it has often been presented as a-historical because it overvalues legislation and denigrates judges. Rabban identifies the Civil War as a turning point in American law writers' use of history. Increasingly American graduate students went to Europe or England to Holmes, and to a lesser extent James Coolidge Carter.
In the United States as in Great Britain, historicism showed up mainly in arguments favoring the common law, although Rabban argues that this statement underestimates the diversity of historical scholarship. The dominant view was that the common law was a product of long legal evolution, and that its development had natural, customary, social, economic, and even biological components that were often beyond the power of the sovereign to control By contrast, legislation was largely ahistorical. As a result, the greatest advocates of historical approaches in American legal scholarship tended to be conservatives who favored the common law and were suspicious of legislation. Among these were Francis Wharton, Cooley, Tiedeman, James Coolidge Carter, and Holmes.
Rabban's final section describes a transition that occurred in the early twentieth century from historical to "sociological" perspectives on law. His main point is that later historians writing about sociological law, particularly about Roscoe Pound, have underestimated the continuing influence of history in their work. Second, the sociological jurisprudence writers misrepresented the classical legal record that went before, characterizing it as formal and static, and denigrating its powerful historical components. In order to bring social science into law, reformers had to sever legal thought from history.
